Q3 FY2026 revenue
$176.0M
Up 2.1% year over year; quarter ended Sept. 27, 2026
Same-store sales
-6.4%
Versus -9.5% a year earlier
Traffic
-4.9%
About 500 basis points attributed to the summer lettuce disruption
Menu price
+0.6%
First positive price contribution after a zero-price second quarter
Product mix
-2.1%
Guests shifting toward lower-priced wraps
October comparable sales
+5%
Traffic +4%, disclosed on the Nov. 5, 2026 earnings call
Restaurant-level margin
10.4%
Down from 13.1% a year earlier
Digital share of revenue
66.1%
Up from 61.8%; owned digital 38.0%, marketplace 28.1%
Trailing net income
$19.1M
Twelve months to Sept. 27, 2026, flattered by a one-time disposal gain
The most useful number in Sweetgreen's third quarter was not the -6.4% headline. It was the decomposition underneath it. In June, traffic fell just 2.0% and product mix cost 4.2 points; in September, traffic fell 4.9% while mix damage halved and menu price turned positive. Same size, opposite composition — and management said roughly 500 basis points of that traffic drop came from a cyclospora scare traced to one lettuce processor. The trade-down narrative points at the wrong line of the P&L: price was never the problem, and the guests who left did not show up in the grocery aisle.
The decomposition
The Headline Barely Moved, but Its Composition Did
June's -6.2% and September's -6.4% look like the same bad quarter printed twice. The build was different. Traffic deterioration of 4.9% was 2.9 points worse than June's 2.0%, but product-mix damage improved by 2.1 points and price added 0.6 points for the first time in two quarters. The headline barely moved while its composition flipped. That distinction matters for how the trade-down story gets read: mix is a price-value signal that management can engineer, while July's traffic was an outside event that arrived from a farm in central Mexico.
| Same-store sales build | Q2 FY2026 | Q3 FY2026 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Traffic | -2.0% | -4.9% | -2.9 pts |
| Product mix | -4.2% | -2.1% | +2.1 pts |
| Menu price | 0.0% (residual) | +0.6% | +0.6 pts |
| Same-store sales | -6.2% | -6.4% | -0.2 pts |
| Traffic excluding the outbreak | not applicable | roughly flat | about 500 bps added back |
Comparable sales: a trough, then a one-month flip
Fiscal-quarter comparable sales for Sweetgreen; October 2026 is a single month disclosed on the Nov. 5, 2026 earnings call.
Unit: %
Q4 2025
-11.5%
Q1 2026
-12.8%
Q2 2026
-6.2%
Q3 2026
-6.4%
Oct 2026
5%
The shock
A Lettuce Parasite, Not a Consumer Verdict on Salads
On July 18, 2026 the Food and Drug Administration named iceberg lettuce processed at Taylor Farms' central Mexico facility as the likely source of a cyclospora outbreak that sickened at least 10,000 people, and Taylor Farms recalled product. Sweetgreen's own food was not implicated; management described the chain as caught by association. The damage ran through the whole salad category. Consumer concern cost Sweetgreen roughly six percentage points of July same-store sales, and the fear spread well beyond one chain: Chopt traffic fell 24% on July 18 against its day-of-week average, and NielsenIQ measured dollar sales of prepackaged salad down 14% in the four weeks ended July 25.
- Management attributed roughly 500 basis points of the September quarter's traffic decline to the summer disruption, leaving ex-disruption traffic roughly flat.
- The guidance damage was immediate: on Aug. 6, 2026 the company cut fiscal 2026 same-store sales to -7% to -8% from -2% to -4% and restaurant-level margin to 10.5%-11.0%, and the shares lost nearly 27% of their value in July, bottoming near $6.45.
- Prepackaged salad dollars fell 14% in the same four-week window, which is the test that matters. Demand left the salad aisle, not the restaurant aisle.
Where the traffic went
The Damage Was Concentrated In-Store, Not On Digital
The most informative disclosure in the quarter is not in the press release. Owned digital revenue rose about 10% year over year to $66.9 million and marketplace revenue rose about 8% to $49.5 million, while in-store revenue fell about 9.5% to $59.6 million. Total revenue still grew 2.1% only because of those two digital lines. The traffic loss is a physical-visit problem, not a demand problem: a delivery order never asks the guest to inspect a head of lettuce, which is exactly what the July headlines were about.
| Revenue channel | Q3 FY2026 | Q3 FY2025 | Change |
|---|---|---|---|
| Owned digital | $66.9M | $60.9M | +10.0% |
| Marketplace (third-party delivery) | $49.5M | $45.7M | +8.3% |
| In-store | $59.6M | $65.9M | -9.5% |
| Total revenue | $176.0M | $172.4M | +2.1% |
Units and margin
Three Net New Restaurants and a 270-Basis-Point Margin Drop
Units are where the real damage sits. Sweetgreen opened three net new restaurants in the quarter against six a year earlier, and the comparable base excluded eleven restaurants with closures in the period, nine of them permanent, so the -6.4% describes only the survivors of a shrinking estate. Restaurant-level profit margin fell 270 basis points to 10.4% on lower sales and higher labor costs, and adjusted EBITDA widened to -$6.8 million from a -3.8% margin. Management is buying traffic back with price points while the unit engine stalls, and a comp that has to be manufactured by discounting is worth less than one that compounds.
| Fiscal 2026 outlook | Feb. 26, 2026 | Aug. 6, 2026 | Nov. 5, 2026 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Same-store sales | -2% to -4% | -7% to -8% | about -5.5% |
| Restaurant-level margin | 14.2% to 14.7% | 10.5% to 11.0% | 11.0% to 11.5% |
| Net new openings | about 15 | about 13 | about 10 |
- The year-end opening plan is roughly a third smaller than the plan set in February, and management now expects about half as many openings again in 2027. The model has to be rebuilt on same-store sales.
- Digital mix reached 66.1% of revenue with 28.1% of sales flowing through third-party delivery marketplaces, the channel where DoorDash is the company's preferred third-party delivery partner.
- The full-year margin guide of 11.0%-11.5% assumes seasonally weaker fourth-quarter margins, according to the earnings call.
Restaurant-level profit margin: the giveaway quarter
Restaurant-level profit margin as reported with each quarter's results.
Unit: %
Q3 2025
13.1%
Q2 2026
13.1%
Q3 2026
10.4%
Supply chain
The Kitchen Vendor It Sold Its Automation To Is Now Its Supplier
Wonder is the supply-chain relationship that matters most for the equity, and it cuts both ways. In the first quarter of 2026 Sweetgreen sold Spyce and the Infinite Kitchen technology to Wonder for $186.4 million, booked a $160.6 million pre-tax gain, and now holds $86.4 million of Wonder Series C preferred stock while depending on Wonder to supply the kitchen units behind roughly half of this year's openings. The company traded ownership of its automation for cash and a vendor relationship it no longer controls, and the equity it received is private and illiquid.
| Layer | Entity | Documented linkage |
|---|---|---|
| Upstream — produce | Taylor Farms (private) | FDA identified iceberg lettuce from its central Mexico facility as the likely cyclospora source; the company recalled affected product |
| Upstream — packaging and produce sourcing | Suppliers outside the United States, including China and Mexico | Bowls and plates are largely produced outside the U.S.; fiscal 2025 carried about 27 basis points of tariff and duty cost |
| Upstream — kitchen technology | Wonder (private) | Paid $186.4 million for Spyce and Infinite Kitchen assets in Q1 2026; Sweetgreen now relies on Wonder for Infinite Kitchen units and holds $86.4 million of its preferred stock |
| Downstream — delivery | DoorDash | Named in the fiscal 2025 Form 10-K as the preferred third-party delivery partner for the native delivery channel; the marketplace channel was $49.5 million, or 28.1% of third-quarter revenue |
| Downstream — competing traffic | Chipotle Mexican Grill and CAVA Group | Both grew traffic in the same quarter Sweetgreen lost it, with digital at 38.8% for Chipotle against 66.1% for Sweetgreen |
- The supply chain is deliberately localized — regional distributors for produce and grocery — which the company itself says is harder to manage than national distribution and limits substitution when a perishable input is compromised.
- One leafy greens supplier was suspended in fiscal 2024 and a pickle supplier in fiscal 2023 after certification failures, so single-source perishable exposure is a live, disclosed risk.
Earnings quality
The Trailing Profit Is a Disposal Gain, Not a Recovery
Net loss narrowing from $36.1 million to $30.7 million reads as progress, but the only profitable stretch on the trailing books is a byproduct of selling the robotics division. Trailing net income of $19.1 million includes the $160.6 million pre-tax gain on the Spyce disposal, and operating income over the same twelve months was -$132.5 million. Cash was $119.8 million at Sept. 27, 2026 against $350.0 million of finance lease obligations, net debt of $230.3 million, and trailing operating cash outflow of $37.1 million.
Horizons
One Quarter to Prove the Traffic Turn, Three Years to Replace the Units
Over the next two quarters the swing factor is arithmetic: a full-year guide of about -5.5% against a -6.4% third quarter requires roughly +3.4% in the December quarter, which means October's +5% has to survive two more months and a harder seasonal comparison.
- Whether the October trajectory holds into November and December, and whether the wrap-driven discount keeps bleeding average check.
- Whether restaurant-level margin lands inside the 11.0%-11.5% guide band, which management tied to seasonally weaker fourth-quarter margins.
- Whether the third-party marketplace channel, already 28.1% of revenue, keeps compounding faster than in-store, which would let volume repair without footfall but would route more of the economics through aggregators.
Over one to three years the question is whether roughly ten openings a year, then about five, can ever be replaced by same-store sales, and whether the mix and margin repair holds once the shock comps are gone.
- Unit growth: about ten openings in 2026 with about half in the Infinite Kitchen format, then roughly half as many in 2027.
- Mix and margin: traffic recovered with $11-$13 entry price points works only if premium plates in the $15-$17 range and the dinner occasion, currently just about a third of sales after 5 p.m., fill the gap.
- Balance sheet: net debt of $230.3 million, trailing operating cash outflow of $37.1 million, and a private, illiquid $86.4 million preferred position in a company Sweetgreen now buys kitchens from.
- Counterparty risk: the Infinite Kitchen rollout, which management calls a cost and labor advantage, now depends on a vendor that used to be an internal division.
Read-across
For Fast Casual, the Trade-Down Is One Chain's Mix Problem, Not the Category's
For fast casual as a group, the Sweetgreen print is good news and bad news at once. Good: the category is not in a consumer retreat. The National Restaurant Association found 54% of operators reported same-store sales gains between September 2025 and September 2026, and Chipotle Mexican Grill and CAVA Group both grew traffic in the very quarter Sweetgreen lost it. Bad: the traffic that left Sweetgreen went to chains with lighter delivery mix and, in CAVA's case, a model that also sells bowls through grocery retail. The trade-down is a mix problem inside one chain, not a demand problem across the category.
| Metric | Sweetgreen | Chipotle Mexican Grill | CAVA Group |
|---|---|---|---|
| Quarterly revenue | $176.0M | $3.3B | $353.7M |
| Revenue growth | +2.1% | +9.6% | +22.1% |
| Same-store sales | -6.4% | +2.1% | +3.1% |
| Traffic / transactions | -4.9% | +0.8% | slightly positive |
| Price contribution | +0.6% menu price | +1.3% average check | +3.0% price and mix |
| Digital share of revenue | 66.1% | 38.8% | not disclosed this quarter |
| Restaurants | 290 | 4,267 | 500th opened in the quarter |
| EV / trailing revenue | 2.4x | 3.8x | 5.0x |
- Valuation: the shares are up 77.66% year to date at $12.01, near the 52-week high of $12.49, yet still trade at about 2.4 times trailing revenue against 3.8 times for Chipotle Mexican Grill and 5.0 times for CAVA Group.
- Digital gap: at 66.1% of revenue, Sweetgreen has far more of its business exposed to third-party marketplaces than Chipotle's 38.8%, so a competitor can take the traffic with delivery volume Sweetgreen must pay for.
- Mix and margin: Sweetgreen's product-mix headwind of 2.1 points is the visible cost of its $11-$13 entry pricing, and it is also the mechanism that brought October's traffic back to +4%.
Today, sales after 5:00 P.M. represent only about one-third of our business.
The stocks this print actually touches
- October's +5% comp with traffic +4% marks a real traffic inflection, but the fourth quarter still needs roughly +3.4% to hold the raised full-year guide of about -5.5%.
- Restaurant-level margin of 10.4% against 13.1% a year earlier, with nine permanent closures excluded from the comp base, means the unit engine is shrinking while traffic repairs.
- Trailing net income of $19.1M rests on a $160.6M disposal gain, so operating income of -$132.5M is the honest earnings line.
- At 2.4x trailing revenue versus 3.8x for Chipotle and 5.0x for CAVA, the discount prices a slow rebuild that same-store sales must fund once openings fall to about 10.
- Transactions rose 0.8% while Sweetgreen's traffic fell 4.9% in the same quarter, so Chipotle captured the traffic Sweetgreen lost.
- Digital at 38.8% of food and beverage revenue versus Sweetgreen's 66.1% means far less exposure to third-party delivery fees as delivery volume grows.
- 84 openings in the quarter against Sweetgreen's three net new, taking the estate to 4,267 restaurants, so unit growth compounds where Sweetgreen's stalls.
- At 3.8x trailing revenue the multiple is already above Sweetgreen's 2.4x, and Q4 2026 comps of +2.1% set the bar Sweetgreen must now clear.
- Same-restaurant sales of +3.1% with traffic slightly positive on $353.7M of revenue shows premium bowls still compound in a soft consumer tape.
- Selling bowls through grocery retail extends the meal occasion past the dinner rush, where Sweetgreen earns only about a third of sales after 5 p.m.
- Fiscal 2026 guidance of 6%-7% same-store sales and $184M-$189M adjusted EBITDA against Sweetgreen's about -5.5% and ten openings.
- At 5.0x trailing revenue, CAVA carries the premium multiple that fast casual is being granted for traffic-positive comps.
- Third-quarter revenue of $4.6B, up 34% from $3.4B a year earlier, with net income of $466M, shows delivery demand compounding regardless of which chain wins.
- DoorDash is Sweetgreen's preferred third-party delivery partner and 28.1% of its revenue runs through marketplaces, so aggregators monetize the shift even as comps fall.
- At 4.5x trailing revenue the multiple needs delivery volume to keep compounding; Sweetgreen's own volume is immaterial, so the position rests on category order growth over one to three years.
