Almost Half of New Long-Dated Investment Grade Is AI Paper — Owning the Index Is Now Owning AI Capex insight cover
Markets / EventORCL · MSFT · AMZN•21 min read

Almost Half of New Long-Dated Investment Grade Is AI Paper — Owning the Index Is Now Owning AI Capex

PIMCO's Nov. 10 note, reported Nov. 12, found that AI-related borrowers supply almost half of year-to-date gross issuance of non-financial U.S. investment-grade debt maturing beyond 15 years, with Goldman Sachs independently putting the share at roughly 40%. Because bond indices are market-value weighted, that flow lands as duration: hyperscalers carry 8.37 years of effective duration against 6.42 for the broad U.S. index and 6.3% of its interest-rate risk on only 4.9% of market value. So the way to own the asset class is no longer the index itself but PIMCO's three diversifiers — agency mortgage-backed securities, AAA non-qualified mortgage paper and dollar-denominated emerging-market investment-grade credit — with issuer quality, not theme, deciding who wins inside the AI cohort.

Published Nov 12, 2026Updated Nov 12, 2026

AI share of new long-dated US IG issuance

Almost half

Year to date 2026, non-financial issuers, maturities beyond 15 years; Bloomberg and PIMCO data as of Oct. 30, 2026

Same share on an independent estimate

~40%

Goldman Sachs estimate of 2026 US IG issuance beyond 15 years, published Oct. 28, 2026

Hyperscaler OAS vs broad US IG index

119 vs 86 bps

Oct. 2026; hyperscaler OAS widened ~31 bps since Dec. 2025 vs ~1 bp for the index

Share of index rate risk vs market value

6.3% vs 4.9%

Hyperscalers in the US index, Goldman Sachs analysis, Oct. 2026

The label on the box used to mean what most people think it means: a diversified basket of large, safe borrowers. It no longer does. On Nov. 10, PIMCO calculated that AI-related borrowers account for almost half of year-to-date gross issuance of non-financial U.S. investment-grade debt with maturities beyond 15 years, using Bloomberg and PIMCO data as of Oct. 30, 2026. Goldman Sachs independently put the same share at about 40% of 2026 U.S. investment-grade issuance beyond 15 years.

AI share of new long-dated US IG issuance

Almost half

Year to date 2026, non-financial issuers, maturities beyond 15 years; Bloomberg and PIMCO data as of Oct. 30, 2026

Same share on an independent estimate

~40%

Goldman Sachs estimate of 2026 US IG issuance beyond 15 years, published Oct. 28, 2026

Hyperscaler OAS vs broad US IG index

119 vs 86 bps

Oct. 2026; hyperscaler OAS widened ~31 bps since Dec. 2025 vs ~1 bp for the index

Share of index rate risk vs market value

6.3% vs 4.9%

Hyperscalers in the US index, Goldman Sachs analysis, Oct. 2026

The disclosure

Half the Long End of Investment Grade Is Now One Theme

The statistic is a flow, and it is the wrong part of the market to be wrong about. A data center generates no rent on day one, so the issuer is selling thirty-year money against assets whose cash flows start years later. That mismatch pushes AI borrowers to the long end, and the long end is what sets index duration. Two houses now agree on the size of the concentration, which is why this stopped being a curiosity and became a portfolio-construction problem.

The measured concentration, and the surrounding estimates
MeasureFigureAs ofSource
AI share of YTD gross non-financial US IG issuance, beyond 15 yearsAlmost halfOct. 30, 2026PIMCO / Bloomberg
Same share on an independent estimateAbout 40%Oct. 28, 2026Goldman Sachs
AI-related debt as a share of the whole US IG universeMore than 15%Jun. 15, 2026Voya Financial
Dollar-denominated hyperscaler bonds expected in 2026~$250bnNov. 12, 2026Goldman Sachs
Wider AI ecosystem issuance (chips, utilities, data center developers)$300bn-$570bnNov. 12, 2026Goldman Sachs
US IG corporate bond issuance, full year$218.1bn vs $107.3bnEarly Oct. 2026 vs 2025LSEG FTSE Russell
  • Financial issuers are excluded, so the concentration is a corporate-capex story rather than a bank-funding story.
  • The figure measures gross issuance, not index weight: hyperscalers are still only 4.7% of the FTSE US Broad Corporate index by market value, so the flow has run far ahead of the stock of AI paper investors already hold.
  • The stock of AI-tagged debt is not small either: hyperscaler investment-grade debt across FTSE's index family reached $500bn at end-August 2026, with Amazon at $144.8bn, Alphabet at $120.4bn, Oracle at $117.2bn, Meta at $81.2bn and Microsoft at $36.5bn.
  • Measurement choice matters: on the broader ICE US Corporate index Amazon carries 1.10% of the market versus 1.39% on Bloomberg, because the ICE benchmark holds 11,755 issues against Bloomberg's 8,909, including more privately placed paper.

Mechanism

A Flow Becomes a Duration Position Because Indices Are Weighted by Market Value

Here is the causal step that turns a supply statistic into an investor problem. Bond indices are market-value weighted, so every new eligible bond from the same five issuers mechanically enlarges their index weight, their duration and their share of the index's spread beta. The hyperscaler cohort already runs 8.37 years of effective duration against 6.42 years for the FTSE US Broad Corporate index, and its weighted average life runs six years longer. Index duration is now partly a levered position in AI capex, whether the index buyer chose it or not.

What the hyperscaler cohort does to the index it sits inside
Index metricHyperscalersFTSE US Broad CorporateAs of
Effective duration8.37 yrs6.42 yrsAug. 31, 2026
Weighted average life17.27 yrs10.95 yrsAug. 31, 2026
Yield to worst6.53%6.07%Aug. 31, 2026
Option-adjusted spread119 bps86 bpsOct. 2026
OAS change since Dec. 2025~+31 bps~+1 bpOct. 2026
Five-year annualized return-2.86%-0.42%5 yrs to Sep. 2026
Five-year annualized volatility9.49%7.66%5 yrs to Sep. 2026
Index weight by market value4.7%2.7% two years earlierEnd-Sep. 2026

Hyperscaler bond issuance has become the long end's marginal supplier

USD billions of hyperscaler corporate bond issuance. The 2027 bar is the midpoint of a $220bn-$300bn forecast range; first-half 2026 issuance had already reached $194bn.

Unit: USD billions

2024

17

2025

109

2026E

First half already $194bn

279

2027E

Midpoint of $220bn-$300bn range

260

The scale behind those bars is what makes the duration effect structural rather than incidental. JPMorgan Chase Asset Management puts the full data-center buildout at roughly $5 trillion through 2030, with about $2 trillion of it financed in the investment-grade credit market, and estimates capex for the five largest hyperscalers at $697bn by end-2026. That is not a one-year funding gap; it is a decade-long asset with a thirty-year liability attached to it.

Fundamentals

Debt Is Not a Choice: These Balance Sheets Cannot Fund Capex From Cash Flow

The second link in the chain is corporate, not technical. When capital spending runs at or above revenue and free cash flow to the firm goes negative, the gap is filled with bonds, and the bond's terms become the company's constraint. That is visible now at Oracle, Amazon and Meta — and it is the reason equity investors in these names are, without noticing, taking credit risk in a construction cycle.

Capital spending against cash generation, trailing twelve months
IssuerCapex / revenueFree cash flow to firmNet debt / EBITDAIndex-eligible IG debt
Oracle105.4%-$24.3bn3.17x$117.2bn
Amazon27.0%-$43.4bn0.84x$144.8bn
Meta43.2%+$30.6bn0.95x$81.2bn
Alphabet33.9%+$22.3bn0.27x$120.4bn
Microsoft39.2%+$62.5bn0.51x$36.5bn
  • Amazon raised long-term borrowings by $107.5bn in nine months, from $65.6bn at Dec. 31, 2025 to $173.1bn at Sept. 30, 2026, lifting total debt including $98.8bn of lease obligations to $271.9bn while net debt more than tripled to $216.2bn.
  • Meta went from $48.0bn of net debt at the end of 2025 to $100.9bn at Sept. 30, 2026, even as trailing free cash flow to the firm stayed positive at $30.6bn.
  • Oracle held borrowings at $125.3bn against $36.4bn of cash at Aug. 31, 2026, and capital spending ran at 82.6% of revenue in fiscal 2026 and 105.4% on a trailing basis.
  • Microsoft and Alphabet still generate cash and carry under 0.6x net leverage, which is why their paper prices inside the cohort rather than at its edge.
The cleanest stress test in the cohort is Oracle: quarterly interest expense of $1.43bn against operating income of $6.73bn absorbs about 21% of operating profit, with capital spending at 105% of trailing revenue. Every incremental dollar of AI capex now shows up first in the credit, and only later in the equity.

Credit

One Theme, Very Different Credits

The theme is uniform; the credit inside it is not. Five-year credit default swaps on Oct. 21, 2026 ranged from 331 bps at Oracle to 56 bps at Microsoft, implying five-year default probabilities of 25% versus 5%, and the hyperscaler cohort's average rating of A contains one member rated BBB- on average and trading roughly 100 bps wide of its peers. Dispersion of that size inside a single narrative is the market's most useful signal about which AI capex it trusts.

Credit differentiation inside the AI cohort
Issuer5-yr CDSImplied 5-yr default probabilityOAS at the long end
Oracle331 bps25%220-270 bps (35-40 yr)
MetaNot disclosedNot disclosed170-195 bps
Amazon80 bps7%130-135 bps
AlphabetNot disclosedNot disclosed130-135 bps
Microsoft56 bps5%Below 80 bps
  • Duration contribution has reordered the index: Amazon climbed from 20th to 2nd among contributors to the US index's duration and Meta from 31st to 8th, while Alphabet is now the largest single contributor to the pan-European index's duration.
  • Insurers roughly halved their large orders in 30-year AI deals between the first and second quarters of 2026, and new-issue concessions widened to as much as 20 bps — the tell that the marginal buyer is stepping back, not the marginal issuer.
  • European exposure is far more concentrated than the US: hyperscalers hold 1.52% of the European index's market value but 2.6% of its duration, and Alphabet alone is the largest duration contributor there.
  • Bonds maturing beyond 20 years make up 0.6% of the euro corporate index against 16% in the US, so an identical AI supply wave would hit European duration far harder than it has hit Wall Street.

Where the AI-related credit actually pays

Construction and GPU financing (private)

Private terms

A to BB quality, 1-5 year tenors; the insurer preference

IG hyperscaler bond

50-225 bps

AAA to BBB, 1-40 year tenors; quality first

IG data center project bond

150-275 bps

BBB quality, 10-20 year tenors; selective

Data center ABS

130-250 bps

A to BB, 5 year tenors; avoid

Data center CMBS

115-375 bps

AAA to BBB, 5-10 year tenors; avoid on extension risk

Public high yield

200-400 bps

BB to B, 3-8 year tenors; avoid

The trade

PIMCO's Three Diversifiers and the Mechanic Behind Each

PIMCO's argument is not that the AI credit is bad. It is that once one theme supplies half the new long end, buying the index is no longer diversification, so the diversification has to come from a different asset class. Three plays do the work: agency mortgage-backed securities, senior AAA non-qualified residential mortgage bonds, and dollar-denominated emerging-market investment-grade paper.

The three diversifiers, with the number that justifies each
DiversifierWhat you ownThe numberThe risk
Agency mortgage-backed securitiesGSE-guaranteed pass-throughs with no corporate credit risk33 bps pickup over US IG corporate spreadsRate and prepayment risk; carry, not credit, is the return
AAA non-qualified residential MBSSenior AAA tranches of mortgages outside the qualified-mortgage definitionExtension risk drove AAA spreads wider, creating the repricingExtension risk is real, and some deals still carry step-up risk
Dollar EM investment-grade creditSemi-liquid IG emerging-market deals financing infrastructure~40 bps median pickup over risk-matched comparables in 2026Country and currency risk; less liquid than domestic credit
  • Agency MBS is the substitute that needs no argument about AI capex at all: PIMCO's carry test, the 30-year FNCL par coupon index yield less the average of 5- and 10-year Treasury yields, stays positive against the broader investment-grade universe, and the pickup over US IG corporate spreads stood at 33 bps on Nov. 5, 2026.
  • AAA non-qualified mortgage paper pays investors to hold extension risk that most buyers refuse, and issuers have begun funding senior coupon step-ups out of interest paid by lower tranches, which accelerates the paydown the senior holders care about.
  • Dollar emerging-market investment-grade paper offered a median spread pickup of about 40 bps over risk-matched comparables in 2026, and a hypothetical shift into emerging-market external and local debt raised ex-post portfolio Sharpe ratios by up to 0.13 over three years.
  • The diversifiers work because they deliver duration without the narrative. Each one is a way to own long credit while owning nothing of the AI capex cycle that now dominates the long end of US investment grade.
The diversification case is quantitative, not stylistic: a dollar emerging-market allocation lifted ex-post Sharpe ratios by as much as 0.13, and dollar EM investment-grade paper paid a median 40 bps pickup over risk-matched comparables in 2026. That is the return available for stepping outside the theme.

The repricing in AAA non-QM creates an intriguing opportunity.

PIMCO, Credit Market Lens, November 2026

The buyers

Insurers, Pensions and Dealer Desks Are the Ones Actually Carrying It

The institutions that ended up holding this paper mostly did not select it. Insurers and retirement managers bought an index or matched a liability; dealer banks ran an inventory book funded off spread; pensions bought duration. Their exposure is therefore invisible in their asset allocation and visible in their results, which is the definition of a concentrated position.

Proposed NAIC life risk-based capital factors: the price of the worst AI credit
NAIC life RBC factorCurrentProposedChange
AAA0.158%0.036%-77%
A0.816%0.168%-81%
BBB-2.168%3.281%+51%
BB4.537%25.156%+454%
B9.535%42.308%+344%
CCC23.798%66.346%+179%
  • Voya Financial's published guidance for longer-dated AI debt is to choose carefully and stick with quality: most of the long-dated AI-related private placements fund data center projects, which it calls an uncomfortable hybrid of commercial real estate and infrastructure, and it advises avoiding medium- and long-duration below-investment-grade data center debt and data center CMBS despite the headline spread.
  • Capital rules push insurers out of exactly the paper that pays best: the proposed life risk-based capital factors raise the BBB- charge by 51% and the BB charge by 454%, while the single-A tranche is the position insurers actually prefer and they have broadly resisted spreadier BBB tranches.
  • Dealer desks are the other side of the same trade, and the reported statistics understate their book: private placements that migrate into the index through bank paper or yield-to-investment-grade conversions push AI credit into index-eligible supply after the fact, so published AI shares are a floor rather than a ceiling.
  • Pension and insurance duration programs that benchmark to an investment-grade index have absorbed the same exposure without an allocation decision, and the hyperscaler cohort's own five-year volatility of 9.49% against 7.66% for the index is the risk they were not compensated for taking.
There is a self-limiting mechanism here that most commentary misses: insurers can earn the widest spreads on the AI-related project paper while regulators charge them 51% more capital for BBB- and 454% more for BB. The buyers with the most capital cannot chase the yield, which is precisely why the spreads have to pay the rest of the market.

Horizons

What Moves in Days to Quarters, and What Compounds Over Years

  • Next two quarters: the trade is dispersion inside the cohort, not default. With hyperscaler spreads at 119 bps against 86 bps for the index and single-name CDS ranging from 56 bps to 331 bps, quality selection pays long before any credit event does.
  • Next two quarters: concession, not spread, absorbs supply. New-issue concessions have already widened to as much as 20 bps, and with 30-year AI orders from insurers roughly halved since the first quarter, primary-market concessions are the fastest-moving price in the complex.
  • Next two quarters: the $220bn-$300bn of hyperscaler issuance forecast for 2027 versus $279bn in 2026 means the calendar, not the macro backdrop, sets the marginal price of AI credit.
  • Through 2030: hyperscalers could approach 10% of the US investment-grade market on JPMorgan Chase research estimates, at which point index duration and index spread are decided by five corporate boards rather than by the credit market.
  • Through 2030: the counterweight is real. The U.S. Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee found no clear evidence of tech issuance crowding out Treasuries or non-tech credit as of Nov. 4, 2026, even though fixed-income duration supply rose to $5.1tn in 2026 from $4.0tn in 2025 with tech investment-grade and mortgage-backed securities accounting for the entire increase.
  • What breaks the thesis: spreads track hyperscaler free cash flow, not ratings. Amazon already swung to -$43.4bn of trailing free cash flow to the firm, so a second and third quarter of deteriorating cash generation would reprice the long end with no downgrade anywhere in the cohort.

So the conclusion is uncomfortable for anyone who treats investment grade as a neutral sleeve. Facts: AI-related borrowers supply almost half of new long-dated non-financial US investment-grade debt, the cohort carries eight-and-a-third years of duration against six-and-a-half for the index, and its spreads have widened about 31 bps since December against roughly 1 bp for the index. Inference: a duration position in the index is now a levered AI-capex position. Speculation: if capped benchmarks become the default for AI-heavy mandates, the theme's weight gets diluted and the concentration premium fades faster than the issuance flow implies.

The trade in one line: stop buying the segment of the market where the theme now supplies nearly half of all new long-dated paper, and own agency MBS, AAA non-qualified mortgage credit and dollar EM investment-grade paper instead — while inside the AI cohort, own quality and let the weak credits be someone else's duration.

Where the exposure sits, and who is paid to carry it

OOracleORCL--
--Vol --
-
Bearish
  • Quarterly interest expense of $1.43bn takes about 21% of $6.73bn operating income, with capex at 105% of trailing revenue and net debt/EBITDA at 3.17x.
  • Five-year CDS of 331 bps versus 56 bps at Microsoft prices a 25% implied default probability against 5%.
  • Near term, spread widening in a BBB- average-rated issuer transmits straight into the equity's financing cost.
  • Over one to three years, a further $220bn-$300bn of 2027 hyperscaler supply keeps the marginal price of AI credit moving against the most levered balance sheet.
MMicrosoftMSFT--
--Vol --
-
Bullish
  • The quality anchor of the cohort: five-year CDS of 56 bps, implied default probability of 5% and OAS below 80 bps even at long maturities.
  • Net debt/EBITDA of 0.51x and $62.5bn of trailing free cash flow to the firm fund 39.2% of revenue in capex without touching the bond market.
  • In the next two quarters, spread dispersion pays owners of the strong credits inside a theme, not owners of the theme.
AAmazonAMZN--
--Vol --
-
Mixed
  • Long-term borrowings rose $107.5bn in nine months to $173.1bn, making Amazon the single largest source of new long-end AI supply.
  • Trailing free cash flow to the firm flipped from +$9.5bn in fiscal 2025 to -$43.4bn, so spreads now track its capex path rather than its retail cash flow.
  • Credit quality still holds: five-year CDS of 80 bps, implied default probability of 7% and net debt/EBITDA of 0.84x.
MMeta PlatformsMETA--
--Vol --
-
Mixed
  • Net debt rose from $48.0bn to $100.9bn in nine months while capex reached 43.2% of trailing revenue.
  • Trailing free cash flow to the firm stayed positive at $30.6bn, so the balance sheet is absorbing the build without a credit event.
  • Long-maturity spreads of 170-195 bps make it the second-widest credit in the cohort after Oracle, and the gap to Microsoft is the trade.
NNVIDIANVDA--
--Vol --
-
Bullish
  • Debt-funded hyperscaler capex converts into GPU orders, and NVIDIA funds itself with $127.4bn of trailing free cash flow to the firm.
  • $99.4bn of cash and short-term investments against $38.9bn of total debt keeps it on the collecting side of the AI credit cycle.
  • Over one to three years, the roughly $5 trillion buildout through 2030 is the order book, and the equity carries none of the cohort's spread risk.
0SK hynix000660.KS--
--Vol --
-
Bullish
  • Third-quarter revenue of KRW 104.6tn and operating profit of KRW 83.3tn show the debt-funded capex landing as HBM4 orders.
  • Net cash of KRW 98.7tn means the memory supplier carries none of the AI credit risk it is selling into.
  • HBM4 is expected to surpass HBM3E on both volume and revenue from the fourth quarter, so new bond supply converts directly into memory pricing.
VVoya FinancialVOYA--
--Vol --
-
Watch
  • Third-quarter after-tax adjusted operating earnings of $240mn, or $2.60 per diluted share, rose 6% year over year, with retirement fee-based revenues up 12% over the trailing twelve months.
  • Its own long-AI-debt guidance, choose carefully and stick with quality, shapes how insurers bid for the 33 bps agency MBS pickup.
  • Catalyst: NAIC adoption of the proposed life risk-based capital factors, which would raise the BBB- charge 51% and the BB charge 454% and pull insurers out of the widest AI paper.
JJPMorgan ChaseJPM--
--Vol --
-
Mixed
  • Fees scale with supply: its research arm estimates $220bn-$300bn of hyperscaler issuance in 2027, after $279bn in 2026.
  • Inventory risk runs the other way, with hyperscaler OAS widening about 31 bps since December 2025 against roughly 1 bp for the index.
  • Over one to three years, a bank that both distributes and holds AI paper earns on volume and loses on dispersion as hyperscalers approach 10% of the US IG market by 2030.